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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK'S
STORAGE OF LARGE VOLUMES OF PERSONAL
FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN A COMPUTER SHOULD
BE DECLARED AN ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
ACTIVITY.
II. WHETHER LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK SHOULD
BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT DISCLOSURE OF
WILLIAM DUFFY'S PERSONAL FINANCIAL RECORDS.
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NO. 83-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
OCTOBER TERM, 1983

WILLIAM DUFFY,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
-

VS. -

LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK CORPORATION,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

On Appeal
From the Appellate Court of the
State of Marshall
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
MARSHALL:
Appellant, William Duffy, who was the Appellee in Cause
No. 82-999 before the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall,
respectfully submits this brief in support of his request for a
declaration that Lincoln County State Bank's storage of large
volumes of personal financial information in a computer is an
"abnormally dangerous activity"; and, in the alternative, that
Lincoln County State Bank should be liable for negligent disclo_lxiii
sure of Appellant's financial records.i
Appellant requests an affirmance of the judgments below
consistent with these declarations.
OPINIONS BELOW
The memorandum order of the Circuit Court for the County
of Lincoln, State of Marshall, is reproduced in Appendix A and
appears in the Record on Appeal. (R.10-12). The opinion of the
Appellate Court of the State of Marshall is reproduced in Appendix B and also appears in the Record on Appeal. (R.13-16).
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JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional statement is waived in accord with the
Rules for the 1983 Competition.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED
This is a case of first impression in the State of Marshall and
is not governed directly by any constitutional provisions or
statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This Court granted petitions to appeal and cross-appeal the
opinion of the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall in cause
no. 82-999. (R.17).
The case originated in the Circuit Court for the County of
Lincoln, State of Marshall, in cause no. 81-101. (R.1). The Appellee, defendant below, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of
the Appellant, plaintiff below. (R.6). In a Memorandum Order
dated February 12, 1982, Judge G. B. Watkins denied the defendixivant's motion to dismiss and upheld plaintiff's theories ofi recovery predicated upon strict liability and negligent disclosure
principles. (R.10-12).
Pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Practice of the State of
Marshall, the case was appealed to the Appellate Court since
Judge Watkins found that there was "a substantial ground for
difference of opinion on questions of law" and that "an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation." (R.12,13). Because of this, there was no finding
of fact nor trial on the merits in the courts below.
On December 3, 1982, the Appellate Court reversed the Circuit Court's ruling on the strict liability issue but affirmed the
ruling on the negligent disclosure issue. (R.13-16). Further, the
Appellate Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply to establish negligent disclosure. (R.16).
On April 15, 1983, this Court issued an Order granting Leave
to Appeal in order to resolve these complex legal issues. (R.17).
II.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

William Duffy, Appellant, alleges he was injured in an
amount in excess of $800,000 because of the inadvertent disclosure of his confidential financial records by a defective computer
owned by the Appellee, Lincoln County State Bank (hereinafter
called "Lincoln" or the "Bank"). (R.1-5).

1984]
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During 1980 and part of 1981, William Duffy was a regular
customer of the bank controlled by Lincoln. In 1980, Lincoln extended a $150,000 unsecured line of credit to Mr. Duffy. (R.3). In
addition, William Duffy maintained both a personal savings acLxv
count and a checking account at the Bank. (R.1).l
On April 11, 1981, pursuant to a State of Marshall Securities
Commission investigation, a Commission investigator informally requested that Lincoln send to her a list of William Duffy's
account numbers and types of accounts. (R.2,14).
Lincoln stores all customers' information in a computer.
(R.1). This information includes records of all account transactions, as well as other financial and personal information. (R.1).
Lincoln's computer is also equipped with a capability that is
able to automatically mail out such information to third parties.
(R.2).
It is stipulated that the correct search data was entered into
the computer in response to the informal request of the investigator. (R.10). However, instead of sending a list of William
Duffy's account numbers and types of accounts, the computer
erred and automatically mailed to the Commission complete
and detailed records of all of William Duffy's financial transactions from January 15, 1981 to April 15, 1981. (R.2,14).
Prompted by the information received through the computer's errant disclosure, the Commission instituted a formal investigation of William Duffy. (R.13, 14). Shortly after the Bank
learned of this formal investigation, the Bank cancelled Mr.
Duffy's $150,000 line of credit. (R.3).
On July 14, 1981, Mr. Duffy was cleared of all suspicion of
impropriety by the State of Marshall Securities Commission
and its investigation was terminated. (R.3,14). However, as a result of the unauthorized computer disclosure of his financial
records, William Duffy alleges he was damaged in an amount in
Lxvi
excess of $800,000. (R.4,5).i
William Duffy filed a complaint in the Circuit Court in an
effort to recover these damages. (Cause No. 81-101). (R.1). In
his complaint, Mr. Duffy alleged that "Lincoln's use of a computer for the purpose of maintaining large quantities of highly
sensitive, personal financial information is an ultrahazardous or
abnormally dangerous activity and that Lincoln is strictly liable
for any harm flowing from such activity." (R.3). Mr. Duffy further complained that Lincoln had a duty not to make unauthorized disclosures of such information to third parties, that
Lincoln breached this duty and that an inference of negligence
should be raised against Lincoln. (R.5).
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Lincoln, as defendant in the Circuit Court, filed a motion to
dismiss this complaint. (R.6). William Duffy filed a response in
opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, alleging that public
policy demanded the adoption of the theory of strict liability and
the adoption of the duty of banks to protect the confidentiality of
customer information. (R.8).
Judge G. B. Watkins of the Circuit Court issued a Memorandum Order on February 12, 1982 denying the defendant's motion
to dismiss. (R.10-12). In that order, Judge Watkins held that
" or public policy reasons, strict liability should apply to record-keepers who maintain large quantities of sensitive, personal
financial information in computer data banks." (R.11-12). Judge
Watkins also held that, "[i] mplicit in the imposition of strict liability ... is recognition of the bank's duty to its customers to act
with care in maintaining [their personal financial] information"
and therefore, upheld William Duffy's negligent disclosure
Lxvi: pleading. (R.12). The case was appealed to the Appellatel
Court of the State of Marshall. (R.13).
On December 3, 1982, Chief Justice Mink issued the Opinion
of the Appellate Court. (R.13-16). In that Opinion, the court
held that "as a matter of public policy the application of strict
liability for the use of computers to process personal information would impose an unreasonable burden upon record-keepers" and that the activity in question was not ultra-hazardous or
abnormally dangerous. (R.15). However, the court also held
that a bank "has a duty to its customers to act with care regarding the maintenance of sensitive personal financial information
about them" and that "the bank breached this duty." (R.15).
The court further held that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply to establish the negligent disclosure of personal information through a computer." (R.16). Thus, the Appellate
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the Circuit Court. (R.16).
On April 15, 1983, this Court issued the Order Granting
±xviii Leave to Appeal. (R.17).1
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Computer-related harm is an all too frequent occurrence in
our society. Oftentimes, when a computer malfunctions and
causes damage, its innocent victim is left without adequate legal
remedy. This threat is magnified when, as here, the computer
has the potential to effect great personal and financial harm.
The computer owned by Appellee, Lincoln County State
Bank, is a storehouse of vast quantities of intimate information
relating to Lincoln's customers. The risk that such information
may escape and cause financial ruin or personal hardship is an
abnormal danger. This danger is intensified by the fact that this
risk cannot be eliminated, even with the exercise of reasonable
care. I Lincoln is to continue to operate this computer in spite
of the abnormal risk, then as a matter of public policy, Lincoln
should be held strictly liable for any harm flowing from the operation of the activity.
Appellant, William Duffy, urges this Court to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, which established strict liability in
tort. The most recent American interpretation of this principle
is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519, 520 (1977).
That interpretation provides six factors to be considered by a
court in determining whether to declare an activity "abnormally
dangerous" and hence, strictly liable. Careful analysis reveals
that Lincoln's computer satisfies all six factors. However, it is
not necessary to meet all six factors to prevail and Lincoln could
still be held strictly liable in the absence of one or more
factors.±
1
Moreover, imposition of strict liability upon Lincoln is
sound from a public policy standpoint. It is more socially responsible to place the burden of loss upon the one whose enterprise created the abnormal risk, rather than on the innocent
victim who suffered harm because of it. Also, if strict liability is
not placed upon Lincoln, Mr. Duffy may be without legal remedy
with which to redress the wrong.
II.

Alternatively, Appellant urges this Court to allow a negligent disclosure theory of liability.
Lincoln had a duty arising from Mr. Duffy's rights of privacy
to prevent disclosure of his confidential records. Although this
is a case of first impression, numerous other jurisdictions have
already addressed this issue. Through statutes and court decisions, they have unanimously proclaimed that a bank does owe
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a duty of confidentiality to its customer. Further, due to the extreme threats to individual privacy posed by newer and more
sophisticated computer data-gathering systems, adoption of this
duty is essential.
Recognition of this duty allows a cause of action for a negligent act or omission which constitutes breach of the duty. It is
widely recognized that the typical computer malfunction results
from negligence. However, due to the complexities of computer
technology, it is extremely difficult to identify specific acts of
negligence. Therefore, this Court should permit an inference of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against Lin12 coln so that Mr. Duffy may have his day in court.±
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK'S STORAGE OF LARGE
VOLUMES OF PERSONAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN
A COMPUTER SHOULD BE DECLARED AN ABNORMALLY
DANGEROUS ACTIVITY AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC
POLICY.
The advent of the computer age has brought with it a host of
unchecked risks and dangers. The early fear of computers has
been realized. Each day, men become more and more dependent on computer systems. And each day, those who operate
computers escape liability for harm caused to men by computer
malfunction.
It is time for this Court to assert that those who operate
computers will no longer escape liability but will be held strictly
liable when those computers cause harm. "In this computerized
age, the law must require that men in the use of computerized
data regard those with whom they are dealing as more than a
perforation on a card." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447
S.W.2d 53, 57 (Ky. 1969).
The fear of dependence upon computers and "automation"
is no longer science fiction. Our newspapers and magazines are
filled with tragic reports of human harm caused by computer error. Jurists and legal scholars, who did not have to confront
these issues thirty years ago, are now increasingly being forced
to explore new legal rules and concepts with which to address
computer-related harm. See, e.g., Federal Computer Systems
Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on
Crim. Laws and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 56 (1978) (Statement of Don Parker).
A survey of reported computer malfunctions and the harm
caused by them discloses a pattern of serious and often uncon-
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trolled abuse. Less than two years ago, a computerized roboti ±3
killed a 37 year old factory worker in Japan. Robots: The Dangers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981, § 3 at 27.1 A computer error
caused a near-collision of two passenger airplanes. CPU Fails,
Two Jets Nearly Collide, Computerworld, Nov. 12, 1979, at 1. A
computer malfunction caused a nuclear power plant to shut
down. Computer Error Closes Nuke Plants, Indianapolis Star,
March 6, 1979, at 1. Another computer error threatened the lives
of American astronauts by causing a serious waste of fuel during the last critical moments of Skylab's descent. NASA Jumbles Skylab Flight Data, Computerworld, July 9, 1979, at 1. Yet
another computer malfunction caused the false alert of another
world war. Norad Systems Goofs, Calls Missle Alert, Computerworld, Nov. 19, 1979, at 1. See also U.S. Aides Recount Moments of False Missle Alert, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 1 at 25.
Most recently, it has been suggested that a computer malfunction caused a Korean airliner to stray more than one hundred
miles off course, leading 269 passengers to their death in Soviet
territory. Explaining the Inexplicable, Time Magazine, September 19, 1983 at 25.
But the harm threatened by computer malfunction is not
confined to personal injuries. The harm pervades all aspects of
our society. Every American has felt the disruptive influence of
computer error in problems with bills, telephone connections,
credit accounts, banking transactions, and so forth. See e.g.,
Robinson, System Design Errors Impact My Existence, Computerworld, March 24, 1980 at 31.
Serious financial harm can also result from computer malfunction. A wholesaler dependent upon a computer watched
helplesslyi as computer error all but destroyed his business.14
An Errant Computer Throws Wholesaler's Business into Turmoil, The Wall St. J., March 27, 1968, at 1. Another computer
error caused a school system to be underinsured when fire devastated a school building. Independent School District No. 454,
Fairmont, Minnesota v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 359 F.
Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The Arkansas Supreme Court cancelled a $28,000 note because a computer error caused a mortgage company to charge a usurious rate of interest. Cagle v.
Boyle Mortgage Co., 261 Ark. 437, 549 S.W.2d 474 (1977). A faulty
computer caused a retailer's business records to be jumbled for
over a year. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.
Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973) affid mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
And a natural gas supplier, which "relied uncritically upon its
computer," sent mistaken shut-off notices to its customers,
1. The text of this article is reproduced in Appendix C.
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many of whom were poor, in the midst of winter in Ohio. Palmer
v. Columbia Gas Co. of Ohio, 342 F. Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ohio
1972).
Banks, like the Appellee Lincoln State Bank, are not immune from such computer malfunctions that can cause serious
financial and personal harm. A computer error erased all of the
records of one bank's transactions. Fallible Computer Unbalances a Bank, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1965, at 1. A computer malfunction caused an improper payment of over $200,000 to
another bank. Port City State Bank v. American NationalBank,
Lawton, Okla., 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973). Another computer
malfunction caused an improper payment of over $74,000. Sun
River Cattle Co. v. Miner'sBank of Montana, 164 Mont. 237, 521
P.2d 679 (1974).
And here, the Lincoln County State Bank computer in errorL released complete and detailed financial information about
Mr. Duffy which caused him damage in an amount in excess of
$800,000. (R.5,14).
From the standpoint of sound public policy, it is no longer
reasonable for the users of computers to escape liability when a
computer malfunction causes harm. It is incumbent upon this
Court to declare that owners and operators of computers will
bear the full weight and responsibility for the harm caused by
these computers. Without such a declaration, the innocent victims of computers will continue to suffer unjustly and without
redress.
William Duffy, Appellant, urges that this Court recognize
the abnormal dangers posed by computers and impose strict liability principles upon the computer malfunction that caused
him harm. Although this Court has never before considered the
strict liability principles of the English case of Rylands v.
Fletcher [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330 or of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 519, 520 (1977),2 an examination of the facts of this case
and of the risks inherent in computer technology demands the
application of those principles here.

Although some would call for strict liability for all computers, Appellant asks that the Court prudently limit the liability to the facts of this case. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 520, Comment 1 (1977). 3 Appellant asks this Court to declare
that the storage and use of large volumes of personal financial
L6 information in a computer, such as was done by Lincoln, isL an
2. See Memorandum of the 1983 Competition, August 25, 1983 at 2.
3. The text of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 and § 520 are reproduced in Appendix D.
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abnormally dangerous activity and that Lincoln should be held
strictly liable for any harm flowing from that activity.
Not only will such a declaration assure protection of innocent victims such as Mr. Duffy, but also it will establish a sound
public policy foundation with which to deal with future cases
involving computer malfunction. See generally, Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 Rut. J. Comp. &
Tech. L. 1 (1979).
Careful analysis of the American principles of strict liability
and public policy support the Appellant in his prayer for a declaration of strict liability.
A.

The American InterpretationOf The Principle Of
Rylands v. Fletcher Supports The Imposition Of Strict
Liability Upon The Activity Of Lincoln County State
Bank.

The doctrine of strict liability in tort was conceived over a
hundred years ago in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher
[1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330. In that case, a millowner, without intention to do harm, constructed a reservoir on his property to supply his mill with water. The water seeped down into some
abandoned mine shafts and in turn flooded his neighbor's coal
mine. The millowner was held strictly liable for the damage
caused.
The rule of strict liability was first stated in the Exchequer
Chamber by Justice Blackburn:
...that the person who for his own purpose brings on
his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril
and, if he does not do so, is primafacie answerable for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape.
Fletcher v. Rylands [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279.
The House of Lords affirmed and applauded this new rule of
law but Lord Cairns limited it to what he termed "non-natural"
usel of the land. Rylands v. Fletcher [18681 L.R. 3 H.L. at 339. 17
These two opinions caused great confusion in America. A
leading commentator notes that the rule was often "misstated,
and as misstated was rejected, in cases in which it had no proper
application in the first place." W. Prosser, J. Wade, & V.
Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 717 (7th ed. 1982).
The first American attempt to restate the Rylands rule was
the "ultrahazardous activity" test of Restatement of Torts §§ 529,
520 (1938). As stated, an activity is "ultrahazardous" if it:
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a)

necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the
person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and
b) is not a matter of common usage.
Restatement of Torts § 520 (1938).
If it was determined by a court that the activity was ultrahazardous, then the person engaged in the activity would be
held strictly liable for any harm caused. Following the promulgation of this test, the Rylands rule "gained added currency."
Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 585
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Alaska 1978).
However, the "ultrahazardous activity" test met with much
criticism. It was said to have "limited" the Rylands rule and ignored the emphasis of American case law. W. Prosser, The Law
of Torts § 78 at 512 (4th ed. 1971).
These problems were resolved in the second American attempt to restate the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520 (1977). Activities are now classified
as "abnormally dangerous" based upon a flexible six factor balancing test "which allows courts to consider many relevant envi18 ronmental,i social and economic factors usually left unexplored
by courts utilizing the more mechanical 'ultrahazardous' test."
Note, Strict Liabilityfor -azardous Enterprises,Returning to a
Flexible Analysis, 9 UCLA-AL L. Rev. 67, 68 (1979).
This new interpretation of the Rylands rule has been
roundly applauded and quickly adopted.4 Dean Prosser, who
was critical of the ultrahazardous test, indicates that the new
rule is more aligned with Rylands principles. W. Prosser, Law
of Torts § 78 at 512 n.47 (4th ed. 1971). The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts hailed the new Restatement approach as "sound
and [it] comports well with the basic theory underlying the
strict liability rule." Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co.,
Inc., 367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876, 887 (1975). The rule has been
found "particularly useful" in addressing the complex issues
surrounding the imposition of strict liability. Doundoulakis v.
Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 448, 451, 368 N.E.2d 24, 27, 398
N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1977). In addition, the new approach will "enlarge the circumstances under which the rule of strict liability
will apply." Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138, 140
(1969).
Since the "abnormally dangerous" activity test is the more
authoritative interpretation of the principles of strict liability,
4. A listing of the jurisdictions that have adopted the "abnormally dangerous activity" test of Restatement (Second) of Torts is contained in Ap-

pendix E.
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Appellant asks this Court to apply it to the facts of this case.5
Lincoln's storage of large amounts of intimate financial data inL 19
a computer easily satisfies all six factors of the Restatement balancing test and should be declared an abnormally dangerous activity. The inherent risks of harm in this activity significantly
outweigh any social interest claimed by the Bank.
1. Lincoln's activity satisfies all six factors of the
Restatement's balancing test and should be
declared abnormally dangerous.
Appellee, Lincoln County State Bank, maintained large
quantities of information in its computer, including detailed personal and financial information on its customers. (R.3). In
processing a routine request, the Lincoln computer malfunctioned and caused the escape of a vast amount of Appellant William Duffy's personal financial information. (R.2). This escape
was facilitated by the computer's ability to automatically mail
out such information, without human intercession. (R.2). The
errant disclosure of Appellant's financial information caused Mr.
Duffy great financial harm. (R.5).
It is important to bear these facts in mind when considering
whether Lincoln's activity should be declared "abnormally dangerous"-for the determination of abnormally dangerous is
based upon the facts of each case. Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell
Wright Co., Inc., 323 N.E.2d 876, 887 (Mass. 1975); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 520, Comment 1 at 42 (1977).
The "abnormally dangerous" approach allows for a "balancing of social interests." Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash.2d
855, 859, 567 P.2d 218, 223 (1977). The approach presents six factors for this Court to consider.
All of the six factors weigh in favor of declaring Lincoln'si±10
maintenance of personal information in a computer as an "abnormally dangerous activity."
The factors which are to be considered include:
a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
5. Appellant has pleaded that the activity in question should be de-

clared either "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous." (R.3). It will be

shown that the activity meets the elements of both tests. See, Section
I(A) (1) at-,

infra.
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extent to which the activity is not a matter of common

usage;
e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and
f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).
In considering the first factor, it is clear that the inadvertent
disclosure of personal financial information from a computer
will inevitably cause some harm, whether it be a person's privacy interests or whether it be to his or her livelihood. The
harms that may befall a victim of such a disclosure have been
indicated in a recent government publication:
There may be many reasons for wishing to withhold information about oneself, other than concern
about Government encroachment on civil liberties. Information may expose one to censure or punishment;
it may threaten one's reputation, social status or selfesteem; it may give others some advantage or power
over oneself, or lessen one's advantage over others in
competitive situations. Information concerning income, debts, or financial transactions may in some situations do all these things.
Selected ElectronicFunds Transfer Issues: Privacy,Security and
Equity Background, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. ConIllgress, Library of Congress Card No. 82-600524 (1983) at 30.1
The high degree of risk of some harm is further intensified
by the great volumes of information now stored on computers.
Information which formerly was destroyed is now kept in the
computer for years because "it is cheaper today to store information than to destroy it." Linowes, Must PersonalPrivacy Die
in the ComputerAge?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1180, 1182 (1979). The risk that
such information will be released and produce some harm is
very high.
The second factor considers the likelihood that the harm
that will result will be great. This means that the threatened
harm will be "major in degree, and sufficiently serious in its possible consequences." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, Comment g at 38 (1977).
In this competitive free enterprise system, personal financial information can be regarded as volatile and explosive, and
inadvertent disclosure of that information can cause as much or
more hardship and ruin than those activities traditionally considered to be subject to strict liability. Smith v. Board of County
Road Comm'rs of Chippewa County, 5 Mich. App. 370, 146
N.W.2d 702 (1966) (water collected in quantity in a dangerous
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place); Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., 54 F.2d 510
(2nd Cir. 1931) (explosives); Davis v. L. & W Construction Co.,
176 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1970) (blasting); Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn.
540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968) (pile driving); Young v. Darter, 363
P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961) (crop dusting); Luthringer v. Moore, 31
Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation of part of a building
with hydrocyanic acid); et al.
One can easily surmise that in this day and age it would be
just as likely for Mr. Fletcher's coal mine to be ruined by± dis- 112
closure of his personal financial information as it was for it to be
ruined by Mr. Ryland's reservoir. Although great harm will not
always result from disclosure of private financial data, it is
enough that great harm may result from the activity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, Comment g at 38 (1977). Inadvertent disclosure of one's financial information can cause
bankruptcy, severe financial difficulties and other extreme hardships. Indeed, the Appellate Court asserted below that "the disclosure of [personal] information can effectively change a
person's life." (R.15). This potential for great harm satisfies the
second factor of the test.
The third factor is that the risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable care. This factor is easily satisfied by Lincoln's computer activity.
There are many reasons why a computer might fail to perform as expected, most of which are not widely understood. A
computer might fail due to a programming or "software" error.
See e.g., Security Leasing Co. v. Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 242, 461
P.2d 460 (1969). A computer might fail due to faulty parts or
"hardware" error. See e.g., D. P. FailureNot Cause of "Near-Collision": FAA, Computerworld, Jan. 28, 1980, at 9 (FAA alleged
failure "was caused by a storage element malfunction in the
reading display channel processor"). Even outside influences
such as a power failure or cosmic rays can alter data or the program by changing switch settings. See Bad Bits, Scientific
American, Feb., 1980, at 70.
In addition to the above, there is no way to make a computer
"error-free." As one commentator has noted, "the onlyl error- _13
free program is one that will never be run again." A. Pietrasanta, Program Test Methods (W. Hertzel ed. 1973). It has
also been noted that it is impossible to write a computer program to check whether other computers are performing as intended. See Charlesworth, Infinite Loops in Computer
Programs,52 Mathematics Magazine 284 (1979). Because of new
and even more sophisticated equipment, the potential for computer error has dramatically increased. Miller, PersonalPrivacy
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in a Computer Age: Challenge of the New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1158 (1969).
And even "a correct program may work perfectly for a time only
to fail catastrophically later without any lack of proper care on
anyone's part." Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8
Rut. J. Com. & Tech. L. 173, 191 (1981).
The failure rate of computers also leads to the conclusion
that the risk cannot be eliminated even with utmost care. Four
years ago, in a Federal District Court case, a computer expert
testified that 40% of all computer installations fail. Chatlos Systems v. National Cash Register Corp., 497 F. Supp. 738, 748
(D.N.J. 1979), modified 635 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 1980). Further, in a
large scale exercise designed to test the capability of our network of defensive security computers, failure rates were as high
as 85%. Pentagon Computers Huff, Puff, Bluff, N.Y. Times,
March 16, 1980, § E at 7.
It is clear that this third factor of the balancing test is met
here. Even with all reasonable care, the risks inherent in Lincoln's computer cannot be eliminated.
1-14

The fourth factor concerns whether the activity is a matteri
of common usage. The Restatement comments that "[aI n activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by
the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, Comment i at 39 (1977).
Under this analysis, automobiles, though inherently dangerous,
would not be considered abnormally dangerous because they
are used by the "great mass of mankind." Although blasting is
widely used in the construction industry, it is a specialized activity and is carried out by a comparatively small number of people. Thus, blasting is not considered a matter of common usage.
The Washington Supreme Court, in applying this analysis to
crop dusting, stated, "[A] lthough we recognize the prevalence of
crop dusting and acknowledge that it is ordinarily done in large
portions of the Yakuma Valley, it is carried on by only a comparatively small number of persons ... and is not a matter of common usage." Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash.2d 855, 859, 567
P.2d 218, 223 (1977).
The California Supreme Court also used this approach in
declaring that fumigation of a building with a lethal gas was subject to strict liability. The fumigant "may be used commonly by
fumigators, but they are relatively few in number and are engaged in a specialized activity." Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d
489, 496, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (1948). The court concluded that fumigation was not a matter of common usage. Id. at 8.
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As with fumigation and cropdusting, those who maintain
large volumes of personal financial data in a computer are "few
in number and engaged in a specialized activity." Since the activity is not engaged in by the "great mass of mankind," Lincoln's storagel of vast amounts of personal financial±15
information in a computer is not a matter of common usage.
The four factors discussed above were considered the "elements of the old "ultrahazardous activity" test. Restatement of
Torts §§ 519, 520 (1938); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520,
comment h at 39 (1977). Should this Court wish to apply the
"ultrahazardous" rationale in preference to the "abnormally
dangerous" balancing test, it need go no further. Lincoln's activity satisfies all the elements of the first Restatement and may, as
a matter of law, be declared an "ultrahazardous activity" and
therefore subject to strict liability.
However, the "abnormally dangerous" test, which allows for
a more flexible balancing of conflicting interests, is now considered a more suitable analysis. See Reynolds, Strict Tort Liability: Has "AbnormalDanger"Become a Fact?,34 Okla. L. Rev. 76
(1981). The abnormally dangerous analysis mandates consideration of two additional criteria.
The fifth factor of the balancing test is whether the activity
is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on. This factor
derived from Lord Cairn's "non-natural use" distinction in Rylands v. Fletcher and has been the subject of some confusion. It
does not mean that the activity is an inappropriate one, for certainly it is appropriate for a millowner to construct a millpond as
in Rylands or for a crop duster to dust crops as in Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d at 218. Rather, the inappropriateness
deals with the way the activity is carried out. Cities Service Co.
v. State, 312 So.2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct.i App. 1975). It involves ±16
any activity that is "extraordinary, exceptional, or unusual" in
relation to the location where the activity is carried on. McLane
v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 326, 467 P.2d 635, 637
(1970).
When the facts in this case are considered, it is apparent
that the type of computer used was totally inappropriate to its
location. Lincoln County State Bank is a financial institution
whose reputation and survival is based, it must be assumed,
upon its financial integrity. However, they used a type of computer that "automatically mailed" out financial information.
(R.2). To use an "automatic mail-out" computer when dealing
with such sensitive personal information as a bank customer's
financial records is blatantly inappropriate.
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Finally, the last factor to be considered is the value to the
community. An otherwise abnormally dangerous activity may
escape strict liability if it can be shown that the survival of the
community depends upon the enterprise. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 520, Comment k at 42 (1977). Thus, the Restatement
comments:
...the interests of a particular town whose livelihood
depends upon such an activity as manufacturing cement may be such that cement plants will be regarded
as a normal activity for that community notwithstanding the risk of serious harm from the emission of cement dust.
Id. at 42.
This sixth factor, value to the community, relates to situations "where the dangerous activity is the primary economic activity of the community in question." Yukon Equipment, Inc. v.
Fireman'sFund Insurance Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1201 (Alaska 1978).
It cannot be argued that Lincoln Bank's computer activityL
117
is the "primary economic activity of the community" nor that
the livelihood of the community depends upon it. The risk of
harm here outweighs the value to the community, and the sixth
factor should be decided in favor of the Appellant, William

Duffy.
Because the activity of Lincoln in storing large volumes of
personal financial data in a computer satisfies all six factors of
the Restatement's balancing test, that activity should be declared an abnormally dangerous activity and Lincoln should be
held strictly liable for any harm caused by it.
2. Should one or more factors of the balancing test
weigh in favor of Lincoln, this Court may yet
declare that Lincoln was engaged in an
abnormally dangerous activity.
The mere fact that an activity fails to satisfy one or more
factors of the balancing test does not require a conclusion that
the activity is not abnormally dangerous. Rather, the factors are
guidelines that may or may not be applied based upon the facts
of each case. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 520 (1977), explain:
In determining whether the danger is abnormal,
the factors listed in clauses (a) to (f) of this section are
all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any
one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a
particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be
required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not
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necessary that each of them be present, especially if
others weigh heavily.
Id. Comment f at 37.
Several jurisdictions have followed this approach.
In Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So.2d at 799, the Florida
District Court of Appeals considered whether the storage of billions of gallons of phosphate slime behind earthen walls was
an_ abnormally dangerous activity. The dam broke and one bil- 118
lion gallons of slime were inadvertently released into a river,
killing large numbers of fish and inflicting other damage. The
defendant, Cities Service, filed an affidavit with the court which
claimed, among other things, that phosphate mining was a natural use of the land and had great value to the community. Id. at
801. The court acknowledged that when the factors were balanced, "the first four weigh in favor of the State while the last
two favor Cities Service." Id. at 803. Nevertheless, due to the
"magnitude of the activity and the attendant risk of enormous
damage," the court held that the activity was abnormally dangerous and imposed strict liability. Id.
In Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.,
585 P.2d at 1206, the Supreme Court of Alaska considered
whether the storage of explosives was an abnormally dangerous
activity. The storage magazine was leased from the government
and located on government land. The defendants argued that
the activity was entirely appropriate to its locale and had significant value to the community. The court concluded that although
the fifth factor was "arguably not present" and the sixth was
"debatable," the activity was abnormally dangerous. Id. at 1210.
In Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1973),
the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether transportation of several thousand gallons of gasoline on a public
highway was an abnormally dangerous activity. A tanker truck
crashed and released gasoline on the highway. The gasoline exploded and injured the plaintiff. The court ruled that the "nonnatural use" distinction (factor 4) was "irrelevant to the transportation of±L gasoline" and held the defendants strictly liable. 119
Id. at 1184.
The case at bar contains facts analogous to the cases noted.
In the above cases, a dam broke, a storage magazine burst, a
truck crashed-all releasing a destructive agent that caused injury. In this case, a computer malfunctioned, releasing private
confidential records that caused William Duffy severe financial
loss.
Even if this Court should somehow find that Lincoln's storage of personal financial information in a computer did not sat-
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isfy one or more factors of the balancing test, the risk, harm, and
difficulty of eliminating the risk cry out for the imposition of
strict liability.
B.

Sound Public Policy Demands The Imposition Of Strict
Liability Upon Lincoln County State Bank.

As one court has noted, there may be other factors to consider as well as the principles of "abnormally dangerous activity." Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368
N.E.2d 24, 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1977). Essentially, declaration
that an activity is abnormally dangerous is a public policy decision. It is an "adjustment of conflicting interests" which asks
who should bear the loss between two relatively innocent parties. Langan v. Valicopters, 88 Wash.2d 855, 567 P.2d 218, 221
(1977).
Many courts have imposed strict liability based upon a riskdistribution analysis. This analysis, simply put, holds that for
various societal reasons, hazardous activities must "pay their
own way." Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So.2d at 801.
Moreover, public policy demands that those innocently
harmed be accorded adequate remedies. A brief review of the
120theories of liability available to the Appellant reveals thati
strict liability is the only legal theory which provides sufficient
compensation for the harm caused by computer malfunction.
1. Based upon risk-distributiontheories, Lincoln is
better able to bear the risk of loss.
The central theme behind the imposition of strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities is that the "unavoidable risk
of harm that is inherent in it requires that it be carried on at his
peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520,
Comment h at 38 (1977). This philosophy holds that the "one
who caused harm to another makes good the loss, regardless of
any fault or intent to injure on the part of the actor." Taylor v.
City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 28 Ohio Ops. 369, 55 N.E.2d
724, 727 (1944).
It is socially and economically more desirable to place the
risk of loss on the hazardous enterprise-for that enterprise is in
a better position to distribute the loss among the general public.
Chavez v. Southern Pac. TransportationCo., 413 F. Supp. 1203,
1208 (E.D. Cal. 1976). Through risk-distribution, the impact on
each individual is lessened. Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765,
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770 (Iowa 1964); see also Keeton, Is There A Placefor Negligence
in Modern Tort Law?, 53 Va. L. Rev. 886, 892 (1967).
Furthermore, shifting the risk of loss places the burden on
the party best able to avoid the loss. General Telephone Co. of
Southwest v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974). Shifting this burden can also act as a deterrent to
future losses. If the imposition of strict liability in this case±I21
would make Lincoln County State Bank more careful in its use
of a computer and in how it handles its customers' financial
records, then that alone would justify its application. See Escola
v. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
The line must be drawn. This Court must unequivocably
hold that strict liability will be imposed when a helpless victim
suffers overwhelming loss from a danger against which he could
not and should not be expected to take adequate precautions.
See Pecan Shoppe, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d
431 (Mo. App. 1978). The burden should be shifted onto Lincoln
County State Bank, the one who created the risk, rather than on
William Duffy. See McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255
Or. 325, 327, 467 P.2d 635, 638 (1969).
2. Strict liability is the only legal theory that properly
addresses cases of computer malfunction.
Although liability for computer malfunction may be predicated on a number of theories, no court decision thus far has
made a distinction on the applicability of any one theory. It is
conceivable that plaintiffs may seek to use a negligence theory, a
contracts theory, a products liability theory, a professional malpractice theory, or, as here, a strict liability theory. One resourceful plaintiff recently pled a new tort called "computer
malpractice" and also a cause of action for strict liability, although neither cause of action was upheld. Chatlos Systems,
Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979), modified 635 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 1980).
All of the theories upon which one can plead liabilityL for±122
computer malfunction are, however, inadequate, with the exception of strict liability.
If one seeks to plead negligence, there are extremely difficult problems of proof due to the complexity and uncertainty
inherent in computers. Gemignami, Legal Problems for Computer Software: The View from '79, 7 Rut. J. of Comp. & Tech. L.
269 (1980). Moreover, there is a great risk, due to the complexity
of computers that any evidence of negligence may be destroyed
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with the whirl of a disc. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.2d 448,
451, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1972).
A contracts theory would also face great odds. In contracts
between computer manufacturers and computer users there are
generally exculpatory provisions. Freed, ProductsLiability in a
Computer Age, 12 Forum 461, 477 (Wint. 1977). In addition, an
innocent third party, such as William Duffy, would have to overcome the requirement of "privity of contract." Further, the Uniform Commercial Code would be of no help here since the
relationship of bank to depositor is not one of buyer and seller,
to which the UCC applies. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1972).
A products liability theory, although frequently urged by
scholars for computer malfunction, would also probably fail.
One Federal District Court has already ruled that software programs are not tangible personal property. District of Columbia
v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Moreover, since computer programs are generally tailor
made for the user, they would not seem to be a product introduced into the stream of commerce, as is required in products
123 liability. See _Freed, ProductsLiabilityin the Computer Age, 12
Forum 461, 475 (1977).
A professional malpractice theory will fail because no court
has ever recognized that programmers or computer users are
professionals. One legal writer has pointed out that no state has
yet to require that programmers be licensed. Nycum, Liability
for Malfunction of a Computer Program Comp. & Tech. L. 1, 10
(1979). It is doubtful, due to the experimental nature of computers, that those who operate computers would be held to a
higher standard of care.
Therefore, strict liability in tort is the only adequate theory
with which to deal with computer function. It has advantages
over other legal theories because it is easier to administer. See
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Leg. Studies 151, 177-89
(1973). Each case may be judged on its facts to determine
whether strict liability is required. McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d at 635. Moreover, on a risk distribution
analysis, it is sound public policy to impose it. Luthringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
Innocent persons like the Appellant William Duffy need to
be protected from the great harm they face from errant computers. This Court must recognize, due to the inadequacy of
other legal theories and due to the benefits of risk distribution,
that the innocent must no longer suffer and that strict liability
must be imposed as a matter of sound public policy. Since this
activity satisfies the Restatement balancing test and the general
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principles espoused in Rylands v. Fletcher, strict liability can be
imposed under the theory of abnormally dangerous activity.± 124
II.

LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK SHOULD BE LIABLE
FOR NEGLIGENT DISCLOSURE OF WILLIAM DUFFY'S
PERSONAL FINANCIAL RECORDS.

Should this Court somehow find that Lincoln's storage of
vast amounts of sensitive personal financial data in a computer
was not an abnormally dangerous activity, Lincoln may still be
held liable under a theory of negligent disclosure.
Both the Circuit Court and the Appellate Court below recognized that Lincoln had a duty to prevent disclosure of Appellant's financial records. (R.12,15). In its Opinion, the Appellate
Court recognized the threat of harm posed by computer technology and concluded that a bank "has a duty to its customers to
act with care regarding the maintenance of sensitive personal
financial information about them." (R. 15).
Cognizant of the need to protect bank customers' privacy interests and following the lead of numerous other jurisdictions,
this Court should adopt a duty of confidentiality as between a
bank and its customer in the State of Marshall.
Once this duty is recognized, Lincoln is liable for breach of
duty. However, due to the difficulty of establishing fault in cases
of computer malfunction, William Duffy asks this Court to allow
an inference of negligence against Lincoln. Such an inference
was granted in the Appellate Court. (R.16).
For these reasons, Appellant urges this Court to affirm the
decision below regarding the negligent disclosure issues.
A. Lincoln Had A Duty To Prevent Disclosure Of William
Duffy's ConfidentialRecords.
In this day of computer access to sensitive personal information, courts must be particularly mindful of the need to protecti the privacy of individuals. This need is dramaticallyi_25
evident in the case at bar.
William Duffy, who had every reason to believe that Lincoln
Bank would keep his financial transactions confidential, became
the victim of a unauthorized disclosure by the Bank's defective
computer. (R.1-5). Detailed records of all of Mr. Duffy's financial transactions for a four month period were released to a third
party. 6 (R.2). This disclosure not only caused Mr. Duffy emo6. Appellant only contests the unauthorized disclosure of his financial

records. We recognize that disclosure pursuant to legal process is justified.
See State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 510 P.2d 1376 (1976).
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tional and mental distress but it also caused him severe financial loss. (R.4). These facts alone mandate the recognition by
this Court that Lincoln Bank had a duty to prevent such
disclosure.
This duty arises out of the need to protect a person's inherent right to privacy. See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1880). That right to privacy faces
tremendous threats from vast information-gathering data banks,
such as the one operated by Lincoln Bank. See A.F. Westin and
M. A. Baker, Data Banks in a Free Society (1972). If a duty to
prevent unauthorized disclosure is not demanded of Lincoln,
then it is conceivable that innocent persons will be divested of
their privacy rights. All will be subject to the capricious exposure of intimate secrets by uncaring and unreliable computers.
Moreover, American statutory and common law recognizes
and supports the imposition of a duty of confidentiality in this
case. Legislatively and judicially, numerous jurisdictions have
adopted this duty of confidentiality as between a bank and its
126 customer.1
1. Lincoln's use of a computer to store personal
information threatensprivacy interests and
demands recognition of a duty of confidentiality.
Prior to the use of computers in banking, a bank customer
did not experience great concern over threats to his privacy.
Record-keeping and information dispersal techniques were inefficient and customer information was decentralized. Privacy
Protection Study Commission, PersonalPrivacy in an Information Society 3-4 (1977). Since privacy rights were seldom jeopardized, there was no need to demand a duty of confidentiality.
See, Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety,
67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1158-59 (1969).
However, threats to individual privacy have greatly increased with the advent of modern, computerized banking practices. Today, routine decisions are made by computers without
personal input from the people affected by such decisions. An
individual no longer has any control over the content, accuracy,
or use of information collected about his life. Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1180, 1181
(1979). The individual is further removed from the information
about his life by the increased emphasis on centralization and
shared data banks. Congressional Research Service, Privacy:
Information Technology Implications, Issue Brief No. IB74105
(1982).
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These threats posed by computers to individual privacy
were noted by the United States Congress in the Preamble to
the Privacy Act of 1974, where it was said that "the increased use
of computers magnifies the harm to the individual that can occur
from collection, use or dissemination of information." Privacy
Act ofL 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522A (1976). Indeed, the thrust of a great 127
deal of recent federal legislation has been directed toward pro7
tection of an individual's privacy interests.
The United States Supreme Court has also spoken on this
most urgent public concern. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), Justice Stevens acknowledged that "the threat to privacy
[is] implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks. . . ." Id. at 605. In
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), Justice Marshall continued that "we live in an Orwellian age in which the computer has
become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society
into a transparent world." Id. at 96 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
State courts have also addressed the issue of computer intrusion upon the rights of privacy. Mosk of the California
Supreme Court, writing for a unanimous bench, noted that:
[d]evelopment of photocopying machines, electronic
computers and other sophisticated instruments have
accelerated the ability of government to intrude into
areas which a person normally chooses to exclude
from prying eyes and inquisitive minds.
Burrows v. SuperiorCourt of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.3d
238, 244, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974).
Banks like the Appellee Lincoln County State Bank are
some of the most visible transgressors on an individual's right to
privacy. Banks routinely share customer information with other
banks and often provide financial information without consent
of the customer to landlords, employers, credit agencies and
other third parties. Linowes, The Privacy Invaders, Barristers,
Fall, 1978 atL 12. A survey of 130 of the largest commerciali28
banks conducted in 1979 revealed, among other things, that:
-- 85% of the banks surveyed did not inform their customers
that information may be released to other customers
-76% did not notify or ask for approval from the customer
when disclosing to third parties
-74% of the banks did not tell the customer about expected
routine disclosures.
D. Linowes, A Research Study of Privacy and Banking (1979).
7. A survey of recent federal legislation enacted to protect the right of
privacy is contained in Appendix F.
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Because of the cavalier attitude that banks display toward
sensitive, confidential information, the Privacy Study Commission concluded that controls were necessary in order to protect
individual privacy interests from bank intrusion. Privacy Protection Study Commission, PersonalPrivacy in an Information
Society, 72-100, 106-124 (1977).
It has long been held that the proper forum for imposing
controls on institutions to protect individual privacy interests
lies in the state, rather than federal courts. The United States
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) held
that the common law of the states, rather than the United States
Constitution, protects the general privacy rights of the individual. Id. at 350-51. State courts are a particularly appropriate forum from which to address causes of action based upon
disclosure of confidential information. Lower federal courts, in
recent opinions, have ruled that disclosure of confidential information, even by government agencies, is subject to state law and
is not subject to federal constitutional protection. J. P. v.
DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087 (6th Cir. 1981); Crainv. Krehbiel, 443
±29F. Supp. 202, 207-08 (N.D. Cal. 1977).±
For these reasons, this Court must recognize that Lincoln
Bank had a duty to prevent the disclosure of William Duffy's
personal financial information. Lincoln inexcusably permitted
its computer to intrude upon Mr. Duffy's privacy interests and it
should be liable for any harm caused by that intrusion. Because
of the increased use of sophisticated technology in the banking
industry, an individual's fragile privacy interests are extremely
vulnerable to the vagaries of a computer. Such an inequitable
circumstance demands the imposition of a duty upon Lincoln in
the case at bar.
2.

American statutory and common law recognize a
duty of confidentiality between a bank and its
customer.

American common law has long recognized that a bank
owes a duty of confidentiality to its customers. Graham and
Barkus, Controlling FinancialMisconduct by Bank Employees:
The Effect of FinancialPrivacy Laws, 98 Banking L.J. 117, 130
(1981); A. Michie, Banks and Banking § 1 (1973). Indeed, every
jurisdiction that has spoken on the issue has determined, either
as a rationale for the holding or in dictum, that banks owe such a
duty.8
8. A survey of the jurisdictions that have spoken on this issue is contained in Appendix G.
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This study has always been considered part and parcel of
the bank's relationship with its customer. Indeed, that relationship hinges upon the expectation of confidentiality. It has been
said that:
[tjhere is perhaps no more treasured or time honored
element of a financial institution's relationship with its
customer than the customer's firm and abiding belief
that the intimate details of his financial affairs thati_ he
has entrusted to his banker will be maintained in the
strictest confidence. The banking industry has always
been most sensitive to its obligation to preserve and
protect the financial privacy of its customers.

130

LaValley and Lancy, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choicefor Bankers, 89 Banking L.J. 979,
979 (1972).
Appellant asks this Court to recognize this duty of confidentiality as between a bank and its customer. Other jurisdictions,
under diverse theories and fact patterns, have specifically
adopted this duty as a matter of public policy.
In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court of San Joaquin
City, 15 Cal.3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1979), the
Supreme Court of California declared that, "it is the general rule
in other jurisdictions that a bank implicitly agrees not to divulge
confidential information without the customer's consent unless
compelled by court order." Id. 542 P.2d at 979.
In Suburban Trust Co. v. Walker, 44 Md. 335, 408 A.2d 758
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), a Maryland Appellate court stated,
"[cI ourts have recognized the special considerations inherent in
the bank-depositor relationship and have not hesitated to find
that a bank impliedly warrants to maintain, in strict confidence,
information regarding its depositors' affairs."
The most frequently cited case concerning the duty of confidentiality is Peterson v. Idaho FirstNationalBank, 83 Idaho 578,
367 P.2d 284 (1961). 9 Like the case at bar, Peterson was a case of
first impression which considered whether to impose a duty-L of L31
confidentiality. In that case, an officer of plaintiff's employer
asked the local bank to provide him with any information about
company employees that might discredit the company. Subsequently, the bank manager wrote the officer concerning the deteriorating finances of the plaintiff. Id. 367 P.2d at 286. The
court, in holding for the plaintiff based upon an implied contract
of confidentiality, said, "[i]nviolate secrecy is one of the inher9. It is noted that this case has been cited favorably by all the courts
that have considered the issue. See Appendix G.
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ent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank
and its customers or depositors." Id. 367 P.2d at 290.
This Court, in approving Appellant's theories, will simply be
recognizing the established common law duty that a bank owes
to its customers to prevent disclosure of confidential information entrusted to its care. The great weight of the common law
and judicial precedent militates in favor of recognition of this
duty in this case of first impression.
Any reliance by the Appellee on the case of United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1975), is misplaced. Although the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff had no standing to contest the bank
disclosure of his financial records, Miller dealt with a disclosure
pursuant to a valid subpoena duces tecum. The court noted that
when there is an absence of legal process, constitutionality protected rights could be impinged. Id. at 445 n.7, see also Id. at 447455 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Miller has been statutorily overruled by Congress. Congressional reaction to the Miller ruling was to enact
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422
(Supp. 11 1979). See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1978) (legislative history shows that the Act was passed due
132 toL Congressional disagreement with Miller). The Congress
specifically protected the right of an individual bank customer
from unauthorized disclosure by a bank. See Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209, 210 (1980) (the act restricts the scope of
Miller).
Therefore, this Court should follow the judicial and statutory precedent and affirm the rulings of both the Circuit Court
and the Appellate Court in holding that Lincoln Bank had a duty
not to disclose the confidential personal financial records of the
Appellant, William Duffy.
B. Lincoln County State Bank Should Be Held Liable For
Breach Of Its Duty Of Confidentiality Under The
Doctrine Of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
Once this Court recognizes that Lincoln had a duty to prevent disclosure of William Duffy's personal finances, then Lincoln can be held liable for the unauthorized disclosure that
caused Mr. Duffy harm.
However, this case is unusual-for the disclosure was
caused by a computer malfunction. When dealing with such
complex and unpredictable machinery, there are acute
problems of identifying the specific negligence acts that caused
the disclosure. These problems were specifically recognized by
the Appellate Court in its ruling below. (R.16). There, Justice
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Mink held "that due to the state of the art of computer technology and the difficulty of proving a breach under such circumstances, one doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply to
establish the negligent disclosure of personal information
through a computer." (R.16).
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence thati 133
allows a plaintiff an inference of negligence sufficient to get to
the jury. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913). The negligence
is inferred from the mere facts surrounding the incident made
the basis of the suit, without requiring the plaintiff to plead and
prove specific acts of negligence. Johnson v. Foster, 202 So.2d
520, 524 (Miss. 1967). It is a tool of tort law which allows a plaintiff to withstand "no-evidence" dispositive motions, such as the
Appellee's contested motion to dismiss, and to reach the discovery and evidence gathering phase of the lawsuit. See D. Louisell
and H. Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases § 15.01 at
464-65 (1960). In cases such as the one now before the court,
where proof of negligence is extremely difficult, economically
prohibitive, or impossible, the inference of negligence allows a
jury to determine, based upon the facts of the case, whether the
defendant's conduct violated a reasonable person standard. See
Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 351, 444 P.2d 558, 560 (1968).
This classic tort doctrine is accepted and applied in every
state of the union and the District of Columbia. 10 It has a sound
public policy heritage, because in many cases, if the doctrine
was not allowed, the plaintiff would not be able to pursue a legal
remedy for harms suffered.
The doctrine has been applied to many diverse circumstances. See e.g., Griffin v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 59 N.E. 925
(1901) (falling elevators); George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New
York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941) (escape of gas from
mains); Ross-I v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills, 140 N.C. 115, 52134
S.E. 121 (1905) (sudden starting of machinery); Bustamonte v.
Carborundum Co., 375 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1967) (industrial accident with machinery); Moore v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 282 A.2d
625 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (landing gear breakage on airplane).
The doctrine is particularly appropriate here, as the Appellate Court indicates, because it involves a case of computer
malfunction.
Computers, with all their efficiency and automation, still require human operation and programming. Consequently, errors
by the various users, programmers, technicians and other per10. For a complete survey of the method in which res ipsa loquitur is
applied in the fifth states, see Appendix H.
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sonnel probably account for the majority of computer malfunctions. See generally De Rensis, The Civil Liabilities of Data
Base Operators,24 Prac. Law. 25, 27 (1978); Brannigan &Payhoff,
Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Medical
Computer Programs, 7 Am. J. L. & Med. 123, 178 (1982). Liability
has been imposed on users of computers who fail to act carefully
in the interpretation and use of computer information. See Neal
v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D.N.J. 1975) (users of
computer negligent because of failure to operate with safeguards to insure reliability and accuracy); Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Hitchcock, 116 Ga. App. 563, 158 S.E.2d 468 (1967) (credit company liable for failing to inspect the accuracy of erroneous information; State Farm Mutual Insurance Co v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d
533 (10th Cir. 1972) (insurer's computer error resulted in mistaken reissuance of plaintiff's policy). Insurer liable even
though "actual processing of the policy was carried out by an
135 unimaginative mechanical device. . ."). Id. at 536.1
Once the duty of a computer user to act carefully is established, it is necessary that liability attach for breach of this duty.
However, the complexities of computers often create an impossible evidentiary burden for the plaintiff. Because of the difficulty in tracing the precise moment and method that the error
occurred, res ipsa loquitur should be applied to the instant
11
case.
Furthermore, the facts of this case meet the test for the application of res ipsa loquitur. We can infer that the injury that
Mr. Duffy suffered was caused by the defendant's negligence
when:
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of defendants' duty to the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1). 11
The first element requires the plaintiff to show that the injury causing event was more probably the result of negligence.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, Comment e at 159. The
consensus of modern cases apply res ipsa according to a "balancing of probabilities" test. See, e.g., Hakenensen v. Ennis, 584
P.2d 1138, 1139 (Alaska 1978); Riedissen v. Nelson, 111 Aiz. 542,
544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975). Moreover, the plaintiff does not
11. This Restatement section is reproduced in Appendix I.
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need to negate all other theories of causation except the defendant's negligence. Danville Community Hospital v. Thompson,
1861 Va. 746, 43 S.E.2d 882 (1947).
136
Here again, common experience with computers indicates
that defective performance is ordinarily the result of human error. Human error may occur during input of information program designs or in interpreting the results of the output.
DeRensis, Civil Liabilities of Data Base Operators, at 27. Although the disclosure may have occurred by some other factor,
the inference in computer cases is that it "ordinarily" was the
result of someone's negligence. Therefore, the first element of
res ipsa is met here.
The second element deals with whether the other possible
causes of the disclosure have been eliminated. Certainly, based
on the facts of this case, William Duffy could not have contributed to the computer disclosure. Although other causes may
have contributed, there are no other causes that have been
brought to the attention of this Court. Paust v. Benton County
Public Utility, Dist. No. I, 13 Wash. App. 473, 535 P.2d 854 (1975).
The Supreme Court of Montana, relying on this section of the
Restatement, held that "concurrent causes may exist and yet
not foreclose reliance upon res ipsa loquitur." Tomkins v. Northwestern Union Trust Co., 645 P.2d 402, 406 (Mont. 1982). The disclosure of William Duffy's financial records by Lincoln, in the
absence of any other rational explanation, must have been due
to Lincoln's negligence.
The third element is whether the negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. If this Court imposes a duty upon Lincoln to prevent disclosure of William
Duffy's financial records, the negligent disclosure of thosei 137
records is clearly within the scope of that duty.
Thus, since all elements of the Restatement test are met,
this Court may rely upon it to establish the inference of negligence against the Appellee. While Lincoln may, through the introduction of affirmative evidence, successfully rebut this
inference, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will still allow William Duffy to have the merits of his cause of action determined
by a jury of his peers. Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the Appellate Court's holding and apply an inference of negligence to Lincoln's disclosure of Appellant's confidential information by its errant computer.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant William Duffy respectfully prays that this Court reverse the decision of the Ap-
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pellate Court on the strict liability issue and reaffirm the
decision of the Appellate Court on the negligent disclosure
issue.
Respectfully submitted,

138

(Signatures omitted pursuant
to Rule IH(g) of the 1983
Benton National Moot Court
Competition) ±
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APPENDIX A
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN, STATE OF MARSHALL
WILLIAM DUFFY,
Plaintiff,
NO. 81-101

vs.
LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This court having proper jurisdiction over the parties, WILLIAM DUFFY (DUFFY), Plaintiff, and LINCOLN COUNTY
STATE BANK CORPORATION (LINCOLN), Defendant, and
the subject matter of this action, denies Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss raises two questions of
law in a case of first impression before this court. Construing
the facts most favorably for the non-moving party, this court
finds that the Defendant disclosed information about Plaintiff's
personal banking transactions to the State of Marshall Securities Commission pursuant to an informal request of its investigator concerning the account numbers and types of accounts
maintained by DUFFY at LINCOLN. LINCOLN's disclosure of
DUFFY's personall_ bank records was made through LIN- iA-1
COLN's computer. At a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the
parties stipulated that proper research instructions had been
entered into the computer terminal.
DUFFY alleges in Count 1 of his Complaint that LINCOLN
is liable to DUFFY for any injuries to him arising out of LINCOLN's unauthorized release of sensitive, personal financial information from its computer. DUFFY asks that this court apply
strict liability to the activity of maintaining large volumes of
such personal information in computer data systems. This
cause of action, if it so exists, is based on the characterization as
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous, the activity of maintaining, in computer information systems, large quantities of
sensitive, personal financial information.
In support of the application of strict liability to injuries resulting from the maintenance of large volumes of personal infor-
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mation in computer data banks, DUFFY cites the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, the famous English case which applied
strict liability against a miller who constructed a millpond and,
without fault on his part, allowed water to run through the land
and flood his neighbor's mineshaft. The rule from the case, articulated by Judge Blackburn, is "that the person who for his
own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
Fletcher v. Rylands (1866), L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279.
±A-2

Banking and financial institutions regularly collect andi
maintain large volumes of very sensitive, personal information
from and about their customers. Although customers have no
property interest in such records, most of the data given to the
banks comes directly from its customers, who have an expectation that the bank will not disclose the information except with
the customer's consent or for service to the customer.
The computer allows banks to maintain and access larger
amounts of personal information than any manual system has
ever made possible. Computer technology also permits information to be maintained in great detail and specificity. Significant
harm might accrue to customers if such information escapes
from the computer system. For public policy reasons, strict liability should apply to record-keepers who maintain large quantitites of sensitive, personal financial information in computer
data banks. What constitutes "large quantities" of personal information is a question of law for the court to determine on a
case-by-case analysis. The facts here indicate that LINCOLN's
computer system contains complete and detailed records of
DUFFY's financial transactions, and that activity justifies the application of strict liability. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count 1 of DUFFY's Complaint is denied.
DUFFY alleges in Count II of his Complaint that LINCOLN
is liable for negligently allowing disclosure, through its computer, of personal information. Implicit in the imposition of
strict liability for the unauthorized release of personal financial
information from computer data systems, is recognition of the
bank's duty to its customers to act with care in maintaining
iA-3thati information. Therefore, LINCOLN's Motion to Dismiss
Count II of DUFFY's Complaint is denied.
This court finds that there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion on questions of law; therefore, an immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.
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SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: February 12, 1982

/s/ Judge G. B. Watkins±JA-4
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APPENDIX B
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
LINCOLN COUNTY STATE BANK,
CORPORATION,
Appellant,
NO. 82-999

VS.
WILLIAM DUFFY,
Appellee.

OPINION
December 3, 1982
Decided
Mink, Barry, and Johnston, Judges
Before
Mink, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case presents several questions of first impression to
this Court. Circumscribing the issues raised in the instant action is the broader question of what impact computer technology will have on the quality of life in this State. These issues
challenge traditional modes of legal analysis.
This case has been brought on appeal before this Court pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Practice of the State of Marshall
allowing for leave to appeal where the trial judge finds that there
±B-lis substantial ground for difference of opinion on questionsi of
law on which the trial judge has ruled, and that an immediate
appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation. This court finds that the parties below and before this
court met all the procedural prerequisites.
WILLIAM DUFFY is a controlling shareholder in Baker
Properties, Inc. (Baker) which experienced a corporate reorganization. Ms. Barnes, an attorney and investigator from the offices of the State of Marshall Securities Commission
(Commission) initiated an investigation into Baker's corporate
reorganization. Ms. Barnes informally requested that LINCOLN
COUNTY STATE BANK CORPORATION (LINCOLN) send a
list of DUFFY's personal account types and account numbers
maintained at LINCOLN. The facts agreed upon indicate that
although a correct search instruction was put into the computer,
the computer instead caused complete and detailed information
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concerning transactions from DUFFY's personal accounts to be
disclosed. The personal information received by the Commission prompted an investigation into DUFFY's financial dealings
with Baker. The Commission requested further information
from LINCOLN pursuant to a subpoena. LINCOLN complied
with that request. Wary of future dealings with DUFFY, LINCOLN cancelled a $150,000.00 unsecured line of credit to him.
The Commission later terminated its investigation, finding no
impropriety on DUFFY's part. The Commission returned the
bank records to DUFFY.
DUFFY filed a two count complaint in the Circuit Court for
the County of Lincoln.
Under the first count of DUFFY's complaint, the Circuit
Court ruled as a matter of law that DUFFY stated a valid claim± ±_B-2
against LINCOLN under a strict liability theory for any damages
resulting from the unauthorized release of personal records
about him. We do not agree and reverse. DUFFY asks that we
apply the rule of strict liability as first articulated in Fletcher v.
Rylands (1866), L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 "that the person who for his
own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." On
appeal, Lord Cairns limited the rule to non-natural uses of land.
Rylands v. Fletcher (1968), L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338-39. However narrowly construed, the rule of Rylands is not applicable to a computer user's liability.
We hold that as a matter of public policy the application of
strict liability for the use of computers to process personal information would impose an unreasonable burden upon recordkeepers. Modern society requires the free flow of information.
Commerce would be seriously impaired if the flow of information were to be constrained by the imposition of strict liability.
Therefore, we conclude that the maintenance of personal financial information in a computer is not an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity.
In the second count of DUFFY's complaint, he alleges that
LINCOLN negligently disclosed personal information to the
Commission. The circuit court below sustained DUFFY's negligence allegation, finding a duty implicit in the acceptance of a
theory of strict liability. We do not accept strict liability in this
case, but must now consider DUFFY's negligence count.i
iB-3
As DUFFY has skillfully articulated to this Court, never
before has so much information about an individual been so
readily available to so many people. These circumstances have
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been created by computer technology which allows rapid access
to and dissemination of large volumes of personal information.
The disclosure of this information can effectively change a person's life.
In this case of first impression this Court recognizes the potential harm that may befall an individual by an unauthorized
disclosure of personal information. Therefore, a record-keeper,
such as a bank, has a duty to its customers to act with care regarding the maintenance of sensitive personal financial information about them.
Customers expect their bank to hold
information about them in confidence and to disclose it only
with the customer's consent or for a legally justified reason.
Under the facts of this case, LINCOLN, as a matter of law,
did not breach any duty to prevent disclosure of confidential information when it complied with a subpoena mandating such
disclosure. However, when LINCOLN released DUFFY's detailed financial records to the Commission, pursuant only to Ms.
Barnes' informal request, the bank breached this duty. LINCOLN argues that no facts indicating its negligence were alleged and it did not breach this duty; further, it is agreed that
the research request entered into the computer terminal was
correct. This Court holds that due to the state of the art computer technology and the difficulty of proving a breach under
such circumstances, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply to establish the negligent disclosure of personal information
through a computer. That is, the Complaint is sufficient if the
_B-4Plaintiff alleges that the Defendanti_ had control over the instrumentality of the disclosure, the computer, and that this disclosure would not have happened but for the Defendant's
negligence.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED
IB-5for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.±
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APPENDIX C
From Robots: The Dangers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981
§ 3 at 27
It was a Luddite's nightmare come true. "Man killed by
robot," was the story that first appeared in the Japanese newspapers here and was then carried around the world.
On Major news service, apparently seeking to instill the
tragedy with a provocative measure of machine-versus-man
emotionalism, prefaced its account with the headline, "Worker
Stabbed in Back by Robot, Dies."
In. fact, a 37-year-old factory maintenance worker at Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. was crushed to death against a
machine by a robot. The accident took place last July 4 along
the plant's processing line for automobile gears, but was only
made public last week after an investigation was completed.
The death was the first recorded fatal accident involving a factory worker and a robot.
According to a report by the Labor Ministry's Bureau of
Standards, the victim of the mishap at Kawasaki's Akashi factory, near Kobe in western Japan, was "careless." The Government investigators found that Kenji Urata entered a restricted
zone when machines were in operation. He apparently saw
something wrong with one of the machines on the line, according to press reports here, and became so engrossed with fixing
the machine that he did not notice the approach, from behind, of
a transport robot that delivered parts to the machine.
But the Government also said that safety measures at the
plant were inadequate and called for improvements.
Some safety measures are needed, according to Paul H.
Aron, a professor at the New York University Business School.
Mr. Aron, a robot expert, recently completed a tour of automated plants in Japan.
"From what I've seen, the Japanese companies may be
counting too heavily on the intelligence of the human operator,"
Mr. Aron said. "We all sometimes forget ourselves and go someplace without thinking. The people need to be protected from
the robots."
At the Yamazaki plant outside Nagoya, Tsunehiko
Yamazaki explained that technology should be applied with
safety in mind.i He pointed to a big transport robot in his plant ±C-1
that can heft 16-ton loads and, appropriately enough, sports a
caricature of the cartoon character, "Popeye.
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The big yellow robot has electronic sensors, Mr. Yamazaki
noted, so that if a person gets in its path it will stop automatically. He directed a reporter to stand next to one of the maching
centers, in the robot's path, and see if it stopped as it was supiC-2posed to. The reporter did. Popeye stopped.I
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APPENDIX D
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS TEST OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977)
State Supreme Court Cases:
Iowa
National Steel Service Center, Inc. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d
269 (Iowa 1982)
Activity involved: explosion of derailed propane gas
Maryland
Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969)
Activity involved: gasoline storage
Massachusetts
Clark-Aiken Corp. v. Cromwell-Wright Corp., 323 N.E.2d 876
(Mass. 1975).
Activity involved: broken dam
New York
Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 448, 368
N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1977)
Activity involved: hydraulic landfilling project
Oregon
McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d
635 (1970)
Activity involved: liquified gas storage tank explosion
South Carolina
Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises,Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900
(1980)
ID-1
Activity involved: fire works±
Washington
Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash.2d 855, 567 P.2d 218
(1977)
Activity involved: crop dusting
West Virginia
Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1 (1982)
Activity involved: gas explosion
Appellate Court Cases:
Arizona
Correa v. Curbey, 124 Ariz. 480, 605 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1979)
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Activity involved: explosives
Florida
Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So.2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975)
Activity involved: phosphatic wastes escaping into public
water
Kansas
John T. Arnold Assoc. v. City of Wichita, 5 Kan. App. 2d 301,
615 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1980)
Activity involved: broken water main
New Mexico
Otero v. Burgess, 84 N.M. 575, 505 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1973).
LD-2
Activity involved: blasting±I
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APPENDIX E
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977)
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
§ 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting form the activity, although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.i
±E-1
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APPENDIX F
SUMMARY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION ENACTED TO
PROTECT RIGHTS OF PRIVACY
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq
(1977)
Scope:

Regulates investigative and regular reports on consumers and provides the consumer with access to the nature and sources of information contained in the fies of
consumer reporting agencies.

The Crime Control Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (Supp II 1980)
Scope:

Limits the use of criminal history files by the authorities and provides individuals with the opportunity to review their own records and to correct erroneous
information.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (1977)
Scope:

Regulates school records of all educational institutions
receiving federal funds and vests the right to inspect
and object to the information in the parents or pupil.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq (1977)
Scope:

Outlaws credit discrimination on the basis of age, race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status
while allowing the creditor to inquire about these areas
as part of any application information.

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1977)
Scope:
IF-I

Gives any individual a measure of control over information maintained about him or herself by the Federal
Government.I

Section 1202 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. § 6103
(1977)
Scope:

Provides that tax returns and return information are
confidential and not subject to disclosure to Federal or
State agencies.
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The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978, U.S.C. § 3401 et seq (Supp II 1979)
Scope:

Limits access to bank records by Federal authorities.
Restricts banks from providing any Federal authority
with access to financial records of any customer unless
the Government notifies the customer and the customer has an opportunity to challenge the Government's action.

Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11 et seq (Supp
IV 1981)
Scope:

Protects journalists from search and seizure. Requires
the Attorney General to issue guidelines to be used in
obtaining evidence from non-journalists who are not
suspected of criminal activity.I
±F-2
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APPENDIX G
SURVEY OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE CASES
The following cases address the liability of financial institutions for disclosing customer's personal financial information.
California
Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13
Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (en
bane)
Facts:

Plaintiff moved to suppress evidence
the state had obtained from his personal bank accounts which his bank
had surrendered without legal process.

Holding:

Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that the bank would maintain
the confidentiality of those papers
that originated with him in check
form and of bank statements of his
checking account.

Rationale:

"A bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion
by legal process matters he reveals
to the bank will be utilized by the
bank only for internal banking purposes."

Colorado
Charles v. DiGiacomo, Colo., 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980) (en
banc)
Facts:

Attorney General, filed a motion for
a subpoena duces tecum requesting
plaintiff's bank to relenquish plaintiff's financial records. From an order denying his motion to quash the
subpoena, Plaintiff appeals.

Holding:

Plaintiff depositor has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bank
records of his financial transactions.
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Rationale:

The United States and Colorado
constitutions protect an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.±
._G-1

Florida
Milohmich v. First National Bank of Miami Springs, 224 S.2d
795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
Facts:

Individual and corporate depositors
sued bank for alleged breach of contractual duty not to disclose depositors financial information to third
parties.

Holding:

Complaint was sufficient to sustain
breach by bank of implied contractual duty to depositor by negligently
disclosing information concerning
depositor's accounts to individual
third parties.

Rationale:

"A bank should, as a general policy,
consider information concerning its
customers as confidential, which
should not disclose to others without clear justification."

Idaho
Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d
284 (1961).
Facts:

Plaintiff depositor filed a cause of action to recover damages for an alleged violation of his right of privacy.

Holding:

The bank had an implied duty not to
disclose any information concerning
a depositor's account to third persons unless authorized by law or by
the depositor.

Rationale:

It is inconceivable that a bank would
at any time consider itself at liberty
to disclose the intimate details of its
depositors accounts.
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Maryland
Surburban Trust Company v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 408
A.2d 758 (1979).
Facts:

Plaintiff depositor brought action
against bank for damages due to
plaintiff's mistaken arrest ultimately
resulting from information disclosed
to police department by the bank.

Holding:

Bank held liable for breach of confidence due to disclosures concerning
a depositor's account without the express or implied consent of the depositor.I

Rationale:

"Courts have recognized the special
considerations inherent in the bankdepositor relationship and have not
hesitated to find that a bank implicitly warrants to maintain in strict
confidence, information regarding
its depositor's affairs."

IG-2

Virgin Islands
Peoples Bank of Virgin Islands v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914 (3rd
Cir. 1977)
Facts:

Action was brought by lending bank
against borrower and endorsers for
repayment of amount of loan.

Holding:

The banks failure to reveal to endorsers information about borrower's financial condition was not basis
for discharging endorsers from their
obligations.

Rationale:

"The bank could hardly have volunteered financial information (or
even acceded to an unauthorized request from prospective endorsers to
disclose such data) without breaching duties of confidentiality and privacy in its dealings with its customers."
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Washington
State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976).
Plaintiff defendant was convicted of
Facts:
grand larceny on the basis of nonsufficient fund checks. Plaintiff appeals.
A call by the police to a bank for the
Holding:
purpose of ascertaining the status of
an account does not violate the constitutional right of privacy.
A bank has an obligation to its cusRationale:
tomers to at least not unnecessarily
disclose their financial condition.I ±G-3
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APPENDIX H
SURVEY OF ACCEPTANCE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
IN THE UNITED STATES
Alabama
Doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
Holmes v. Birmingham Transit Co., 270 Ala. 215, 166 S.2d 912
(1959)
Alaska
Doctrine gives rise to an inference of negligence.
Crawford v. Rogers, 406 P.2d 189 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1965)
Arizona
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
O'Donnell v. Maves, 103 Ariz. 88, 436 P.2d 577 (1968)
Arkansas
Doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
Sherman v. Mountaire Poultry Co., 243 Ariz. 301, 419 S.W.2d
619 (1967)
California
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Cal.2d 154, 41 Cal. Rptr.
577, 397 P.2d 161 (1964)
Colorado
J.H-1

Doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958)1
Connecticut
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Lowman v. Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 665, 192 A.2d 883
(1963)
Delaware
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co., Del., 239 A.2d 703 (1968)
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District of Columbia
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Martin v. United States, 96 App. D.C. 294, 225 F.2d 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1955)
Florida
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Messina v. Baldi, 120 So.2d 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
Georgia
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Bowers v. Fred W. Amend Co., 72 Ga. App. 714, 35 S.E.2d 15
(Ga. Ct. App. 1945)
Hawaii
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 77, 412 P.2d
669 Reh. Den. 49 Hawaii 267, 414 P.2d 428 (1966)
Idaho
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 418 P.2d 278 (1966).1
Illinois
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc., 42 ll.2d 345, 247 N.E.2d
877 (1969)
Indiana
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 27 Ind.
456, 146 N.E.2d 531 (1957)
Iowa
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
De Moss v. Darwin T. Lynner Constr. Co., 159 N.W.2d 463
(Iowa 1968)
Kansas
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Stroud v. Sinclair Refining Co., 144 Kan. 74, 58 P.2d 77 (1936)

±H-2
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Kentucky
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Thompson v. Kost, 298 Ky 32, 181 S.W.2d 445 (1944)
Louisiana
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Sharette v. Fontcuberta, 246 So.2d 867 (La. Ct. App. 1971)
Maryland
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Munzert v. American Stores Co., 232 Md. 97, 192 A.2d 59
(1963)1
±H-3
Massachusetts
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Rosciono v. Columal Beacon Oil Co., 294 Mass. 234, 200 N.E.
883 (1936)
Michigan
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthew Stores, Inc.,
349 Mich. 441, 84 N.W.2d 755 (1957)
Minnesota
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Hoffman v. Nasland, 274 Minn. 521, 144 N.W.2d 580 (1966)
Mississippi
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
J.C. Penney Co. v. Evans, 172 Miss. 900, 160 So. 779 (1935)
Missouri
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Cunningham v. Hayesm, 463 S.W.2d 555 (Mo.Ct. App. 1971)
Montana
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965)
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Nebraska
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 161 Neb. 280, 73 N.W.2d 228
(1955)1
Nevada
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Garibaldi Brothers Trucking Co. v. Waldren, 321 P.2d 248
(1958)
New Hampshire
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Gobbi v. Moulton, 108 N.H. 183, 230 A.2d 747 (1967)
New Jersey
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Gould J. Windkur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916, (N.J.
Super. Ct.App. Div. 1969)
New Mexico
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Pack v. Read, 77 N.M. 76, 419 P.2d 453 (1966)
New York
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Wendover v. State, 63 Misc.2d 368, 313 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Ct.
Cl. 1970)
North Carolina
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
McGraw v. Southern R. Co., 206 N.C. 873, 175 S.E. 286 (1934)
North Dakota
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Bergley v. Mann's, 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959)1-H-5
Ohio
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Kohler, 111 Oho App. 225, 12
Ohio Ops.2d 366, 165 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)

H-4
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Oklahoma
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rukken, 372 F.2d 8 (10 Cir. 1967)
Oregon
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Centennial Mills Inc. v. Benson, 234 Or. 512, 383 P.2d 103
(1963)
Pennsylvania
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Haddon v. Lotito, 399 Pa. 521, 161 A.2d 160 (1960)
Rhode Island
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Scittadell v. Providence Gas. Co., 415 A.2d 1040 (R.I. 1980)
South Carolina
Doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
Sweeney v. Carr/Puter Intern. Corp., 521 F. Supp. 276
(D.C.S.C. 1981)
South Dakota
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Larson v. Loucks, 69 S.D. 60, 6 N.W.2d 436 (1943)_
±H-6
Tennessee
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Ten. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1953)
Texas
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Morris v. Texas & M.O.R. Co., 269 S.W. 565 (Tx. Civ. App.Beaumont 1954)
Utah
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660
(1950)
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Vermont

Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
McDonald v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 Vt. 221, 154 A.2d
,469 (1959)
Virginia
Doctrine gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 156 S.E.2d 787 (1967)
Washington
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Tuengel v. Stobbs, 59 Wash.2d 477, 367 P.2d 1008 (1962)
West Virginia
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Holley v. Purity Bailing Co., 128 W.Va. 531, 37 S.E.2d 729
(1946)1
IH-7
Wisconsin
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Beaudoin v. Waterman Memorial Hospital, 32 Wis. 2d 132,
145 N.W.2d 166 (1966)
Wyoming
Doctrine allows for an inference of negligence.
Sayre v. Allemand, 418 P.2d 1006 (Wyo. 1966)1-H-8
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APPENDIX I
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 328D (1977)
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
§ 328 D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is
caused by negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of
the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the
inference may reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it
must necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the
inference is to be drawn in any case where different conclusions
±I-1 may reasonably be reached.I

